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Chapter 3 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions and Changes in Industrial Concentration 
in Brazilian Mining and Manufacturing Industries: 1996-2000 
 
Frederico Rocha 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This paper aims at studying the role played by Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) on 
changes in market concentration that took place in Brazilian manufacturing and mining 
industries between 1996 and 2000. More specifically, the paper attempts to: assess 
changes in average market concentration from 1996 and 2000; and determine the 
importance of M&A in explaining changes in concentration. 
 
During the 90’s, the Brazilian economy went through profound changes in ownership 
structures. Mostly, these changes were the result of the privatization of formerly state-
owned enterprises and of the opening of the economy to competition. According to 
Thomson Financial Securities Data, 582 companies went through ownership changes in 
the 90’s. These companies represented about one-quarter of the value added in the 
manufacturing and mining industries and ten percent of the employment. Furthermore, 
ownership changes have affected most sectors in manufacturing and mining industries. In 
the 90’s 86 of the 106 three-digit sectors in manufacturing had at least one company 
transacted. These figures go down to 68 sectors when data is limited to 1997-1999 years. 
Motor vehicles’ parts and accessories (45 transactions), integrated primary metals (33), 
other food products (30) and organic chemicals (30) were the sectors with more frequent 
transactions.  
 
The literature on industrial organization has stressed the importance of M&A in the 
determination of market structures. Actually, the whole idea that M&A transactions 
provoke concentration was considered far from challenging. In fact, the capacity to 
capture changes in concentration emerging from M&A is a criterion to assess the 
adequacy of concentration indexes. Therefore, the debate focused on the assessment of 
the level of impact on concentration changes. Hannah and Kay (1977) have shown that 
M&A were the driving force of industrial concentration in British industries from the 
beginning of the century to the 60’s. Muller (1976) has obtained similar results in the 
analysis of a few industries in Germany. Pryor (2001, 2002) has argued that M&A are the 
main explanation for the increase in industrial concentration in US industries from the 
80’s to 1997. Nissan (1997, 1998) has followed similar steps explaining the increase in 
aggregate concentration. In both cases (Nissan 1997,1998 and Pryor 2001,2002), authors 
have stressed the importance of changes in antitrust legislation to explain the increase in 
concentration.  
 
However, the impact of M&A transactions on concentration may vary according to the 
type of transation taking place, the firms involved and the dynamic effects of 
concentration: 
(i) Transactions may involve mergers of firms in the same industry. In this case, 
adequate concentration indexes should capture the increase in concentration;  
(ii) Transactions may involve conglomerate mergers. These situations should 
imply increase in aggregate concentration but be neutral in respect to sectoral 
concentration;  
(iii) Acquiring firms may be new entrants into the industry. Once more, these 
transactions should be neutral in respect to sectoral concentration;  
(iv) Acquired firms may be spin-offs from bigger companies and acquiring firms 
may be fringe companies. In this case, M&A transactions may have negative 
effect on concentration; and 
(v) Furthermore, dynamic effects may change the static results. Transactions may 
be followed by divestments, closures and losses of competitiveness and 
therefore have negative dynamic consequences over concentration levels. On 
the other hand, they may be accompanied by addition in productive capacity 
and thus they will deepen changes in concentration. 
 
The work of Liebeskind, Opler and Hatfield (1996) attempts to cope with some of these 
effects. Using more appropriate data for US industry in the 80’s, they classify 
organizational changes according to changes in the status of industry establishment and 
changes in the status of industry incumbent firms. They conclude that concentration 
effects of industry restructuring are positive only when incumbent firms add capacity to 
the industry. 
 
M&A transactions in Brazil during the 90’s have many features stressed in the above 
paragraphs. As has been shown in Rocha and Kupfer (2002), one of the most important 
characteristics of the M&A wave of the 90’s, in Brazil, was the major participation of 
multinational enterprises. In fact, 218 out of the 292 transactions that took place between 
1997 and 1999 had multinational companies as acquirers. As a consequence, Rocha and 
Kupfer (2002) working with very high levels of aggregation – they divided the 
manufacturing and mining industries into three sectors named as commodities, traditional 
manufacturing and technology intensive industries – have found that during the 1990-
1996 period there was a reduction in concentration in all sectors. From 1997 to 1999 the 
trend is unclear. They have found a slight increase in the concentration ratios of 
traditional manufacturing and commodities industries while the technology intensive 
industry presented a small decrease in concentration. 
 
However, the high level of sectoral aggregation and the limited scope of the company 
sample used to calculate the level of concentration in Rocha and Kupfer (2002) suggest 
that a deeper investigation is necessary in order to capture the adequate direction of 
concentration indexes and the influence of M&A transactions in the process. This paper 
will attempt to add information on these features, measuring industrial concentration in 
specific markets and estimating the relevance of M&A transactions in structural changes. 
The next section will show the data set used in the paper, determine its main virtues and 
limitations and define the methodology used in the analysis. Section three presents the 
main empirical results of the analysis, comments on possible biases and speculates on 
possible sources of explanation of the results. The concluding section discusses the 
direction of the main conclusions obtained from the analysis carried out in this paper and 
suggests some possible extensions of this work.  
 
II.  Methodology 
2.1 Database 
 
This paper uses three data sources:  
(i) Annual Industrial Survey – Companies (PIA), published by Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) for the years 1996 and 2000. PIA 
has supplied data on sales, employment, number of companies and four, eight 
and twelve firms concentration ratio;  
(ii) Technology Innovation Survey 2000 (PINTEC), also published by IBGE. This 
survey has supplied data on number of innovating firms, number of firms 
executing product innovations, R&D expense levels for 2000; 
(iii) Thomson Financial Securities Data provided information on ownership 
changes from 1990 to 1999. 
 
2.2 The Period  
 
The paper analyzes concentration changes from 1996 to 2000. The choice of this period 
limits the analysis in two aspects: 
(i) Five year periods may be short to capture structural changes; and  
(ii) The M&A wave began in the early 90’s. The coverage of the whole period 
would have been more adequate.  
 
However, there are good reasons to make this choice. First, there are data limitations. 
Though Thomson Financial provides M&A information for the whole decade, the use of 
information from PIA for the early 90’s may be inadequate. The sample of firms and 
sectoral classification used in PIA changed in 1995. Therefore, estimates of sales and 
employment follow different methodology. Furthermore, the number of transactions that 
took place between 1997 and 1999 are far from irrelevant. Table 1 shows that 292 out of 
582 transactions took place in the 1997-1999 period.  
 
2.3 Transactions 
 
The paper takes into account only those transactions that involved the exchange of over 
50% of stock. This includes 71% of the transactions that took place between 1990 and 
1999 and 75% of the transactions that occurred between 1997 and 1999 (see table 1). The 
reason of this choice was to avoid including transactions that did not involve strategic 
control of the acquired company. For instance, some Brazilian banks have bought minor 
participations in company’s share in order to diversify their portfolio or to have access to 
internal information, however, no attempt is made by these banks to control the market 
behavior of these companies neither do they have control over capital accumulation 
capabilities. 
 
The ideal way to measure the direct effect of M&A on concentration would be to 
calculate the concentration index before the transaction then to add sales of the acquired 
firm to the sales of the acquiring firm and finally to recalculate the concentration index. 
This procedure was used by (Hannah and Kay 1977). The most important shortcoming of 
this method is the lack of ability to capture indirect effects, such as the addition of 
productive capacity, closure of plants, etc.  
 
An alternative way to approach the problem would be to measure concentration levels in 
the beginning and the end of the period. Afterwards, one would calculate the size of the 
transaction phenomena by adding sales of acquired companies in a specific type of 
transaction and dividing the result by sector’s sales and then to control for strategic 
variables that may affect firms’ competitiveness and concentration levels. This procedure 
was adopted in Liebeskind, Opler and Hatfield (1996). 
 
However, in order to follow either procedure one should have access to adequate data. In 
the case of this paper, a number of obstacles have been found that make impossible to 
follow either approaches: 
(i) In order to obtain information on individual firm size from IBGE, one should 
have access to firm’s fiscal codes. This procedure was attempted with a rate of 
success of only 50% of the acquired companies;  
(ii) IBGE does not provide information at the company level. Therefore, sales of 
acquired companies would only be provided whenever over three companies 
would be transacted. This would require the use of a very high level of 
aggregation, which would be inadequate; and  
(iii) Other data sources did not show higher success rate.1 
                                                             
1 We have tried capturing information from Gazeta Mercantil – Anuário da Gazeta Mercantil, for many years.  
 Therefore, the only reliable information is the number of transactions. However, the use 
of the number of transactions as indicator for intensity of M&A faces a major 
shortcoming. Transactions involving very large companies and small companies are 
equally considered. However, they play very different roles in respect to market 
concentration. One way to overcome this deficiency would be to weigh the number of 
transactions using the value of each transaction. However, Thomson Financial provides 
information for less than half of the transactions. This paper has chosen to use a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 in all sectors where at least one transaction has been identified. 
In this sense the coefficient will be capturing the aggregate impact of all transactions that 
took place in that sector.  
 
2.4 Market Definition 
 
The use of official statistical sources limits the choices one can make with respect to 
market definition. Usually, national standard classifications follow the criterion of 
similarity at the production side and do not consider demand substitution as a key 
variable. The CNAE2 (Classificação Nacional de Atividades Econômicas) is no exception. 
The CNAE has been in use by IBGE since 1995 and it was elaborated in order to 
adequate Brazilian sect oral classification to the ISIC.  
 
The CNAE allows sect oral classifications at the two, three and four digit levels. This 
paper uses the three-digit CNAE classification. At this level of aggregation, the CNAE is 
divided into 106 sectors. For two sectors – natural gas exploration and fabrication of 
nuclear material – the PIA does not provide information due to the small number of firms 
in activity in these sectors. This choice takes into account two key arguments: 
(i) The level of diversification of Brazilian companies is quite low. According to 
IBGE, in 1994, about 2% of companies in manufacturing had activities in 
more than one three-digit sector. This group of companies was responsible for 
18% of total sales. If the paper took into account lower levels of aggregation 
                                                             
2 The CNAE can be viewed at http://www2.ibge.gov.br/pub.  
the risk of considering a sales outside its original sector would increase, 
though it would be more closely related to the relevant market; and  
(ii) The number of companies in some four-digit sectors would be small. This 
could create obstacles for IBGE to reveal concentration ratios in some cases. 
 
An additional limitation of this study is the failure to account for the external sector. 
Exports and imports are not considered in the elaboration of concentration ratio. This can 
lead to two kinds of miscalculations:  
(i) The failure to add imports to the denominator of concentration ratios would 
imply the overestimation of concentration; and  
(ii) If imports are mainly derived from subsidiaries of multinational enterprises 
that are also market leaders in Brazil, the bias can be reversed.  
 
2.5 Concentration Indexes 
 
The debate on the influence of M&A over concentration stresses the importance of biases 
created by wrong choices of concentration indexes.3 Hay and Morris (1991) state that the 
choice of concentration indexes should obey some properties:  
(i) If the size distribution of firms is maintained constant, the inclusion of an 
additional firm should decrease concentration; 
(ii) Taking the number of firms as constant, an increase in the inequality of size 
distribution should augment concentration; 
(iii) If the concentration curve of market A is higher than the concentration curve 
of market B in all points, then concentration indexes should reproduce the 
phenomenon; and  
(iv) Mergers should increase concentration. 
 
The choice of concentration indexes is nonetheless restrained by data availability. This 
work had access to concentration ratios. Concentration ratios are subjected to two main 
shortcomings: 
                                                             
3 See Hannah and Kay 1981, Hart 1981 and Prais 1981. 
(i) They analyze only one point in the concentration curve. In this sense the 
choice of the right point in the concentration curve would be crucial. For 
instance, an industry may have lower concentration than other industry 
according to the four firm concentration ratio;  
(ii) However, it may have higher concentration at the eight firm concentration 
ratio. Which measure is more appropriate would depend on competition 
conditions of each industry; and  
(iii) It does not take into account the number of firms in an industry. For instance a 
four firm concentration index will not capture changes in concentration by the 
entry of a new firm that does not belong to the CR4. 
 
In order to overcome some of these problems, the paper uses three concentration ratios: 
four-firm (CR4), eight-firm (CR8) and twelve-firm (CR12). This option helps to attenuate 
some of the shortcomings of concentration ratios:  
(i) It covers more than one point in the concentration curve; and  
(ii) Lowers the probability that new entries won’t be covered by the index. 
 
2.6 Organization of the Results  
 
The results of this paper are organized in two different parts. First, the paper makes an 
analysis ofthe evolution of concentration in the Brazilian manufacturing and mining 
industries and its relation with the occurrence of M&A transactions. Second, the paper 
uses a ordinary least square equation to control results for structural variables. The 
equation is represented by: 
 
ebb
bbbbba
++
++++++=
DPRODCR
AFINOVPRODINTTECrentryrgrdCR
i
i
76
54321
1996
&
 
 
where 
(i) dCRi is the change in concentration ratio at the ith firm level in the 
1996/2000 period, obtained from PIA;  
(ii) rgr is the rate of growth of the market sales, represented by the rate of 
change in the sector’s share of total manufacturing and mining 
industry sales, between 1996 and 2000, supplied by PIA;  
(iii) rentry is the rate of entry of new companies in the period, also 
obtained from PIA;  
(iv) inttec is the industry’s technology intensity, represented by the rate of 
R&D to total sales, for the year 2000, obtained from PINTEC 2000;  
(v) difprod is a measure for product differentiation, represented by the 
number of companies that have performed product innovation, vis-à-
vis the total number of companies in the industry, for the year 2000, 
obtained from PINTEC 2000;  
(vi) M&A is a dummy for the occurrence of mergers and acquisition 
transactions; Cri1996 is the concentration ratio at the ith firm level for 
the year 1996, obtained from PIA; and  
(vii) Dprod is the change in productivity, represented by the rate of change 
in labor productivity between 1996 and 2000. 
 
The introduction of control variables follows the works of Pryor (1994) and Liebeskind, 
Opler and Hatfield (1996). The descriptive statistics for the variables and their Pearson 
correlation indexes can be seen at tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
 
III. Results 
3.1 Changes in Industrial Concentration  
 
Table 4 provides information on weighted and arithmetic average for four, eight and 
twelve firm concentration ratios at the year 1996. By both criteria, the average CR4 of the 
manufacturing and mining industries is around 0,42. This is higher than the weighted 
average CR4 of the US manufacturing industry for at the four-digit4 level for 1992 and 
similar to the CR4 for 1997. The CR8 also has the same comparative terms.5 Therefore, 
due to the differences in the aggregation level – three-digit for the Brazilian case and 
                                                             
4 Resulting in three hundred and sixteen sectors. 
5 US comparative data obtained from Pryor (2002). 
four-digit for the US – the Brazilian manufacturing and mining industries appear to be 
quite concentrated.  
 
Table 4 has also information on changes of concentration ratios by three different criteria: 
(i) The weighted average by the share of sales of each sector in 1996;  
(ii) The weighted average by the share of sales of each sector in 2000; and 
(iii) The arithmetic average. 
 
Changes in the arithmetic average of concentration ratios are positive, though quite small, 
and do not appear to be statistically significantly different from zero. Changes according 
to weighted average are also positive and larger. This suggests that sectors with higher 
increases in concentration ratios have in average larger markets in terms of sales. 
Furthermore, changes in average concentration ratio are larger when they are weighed by 
2000 sales than when they are weighed by 1996 sales. This may indicate that, in average, 
sectors with higher rates of growth had higher increase in their concentration level. In fact, 
table 3 shows that the rates of growth of revenue are positively and significantly 
correlated to changes in concentration ratios. It is also interesting to note that in absolute 
terms the greater change in concentration occurs at the eight-firm concentration ratio for 
all three averages. This may suggest that market shares of firms situated between the 
ninth and the twelfth rankings are being shrunk on behalf of the eight largest firms.  
 
Pryor (2001, 2002) show a change in concentration ratios in the fifteen years period from 
1982 to 1997 of about 5 percentage points. The maintenance of the trend verified for the 
Brazilian economy for the next ten years would point to a structural change similar to the 
one suffered by the US in the period evaluated by Pryor. This means that the continuation 
of this pattern of change would imply an enormous transformation in Brazilian market 
structure. 
 
Changes in concentration ratios are far from uniform across sectors. Table 4 and table 3 
shows that standard deviations of changes in concentration ratios are quite high. For 
instance, the minimum value of changes in CR4 is –0,40, in the case of Shipbuilding, and 
the maximum value is Office Machinery, which increased CR4 in 0,3763. Therefore, 
sectors are quite heterogeneous with respect to changes in concentration ratios. It would 
therefore be interesting to explain some of these differences. 
 Table 4 also shows the comparison of changes in concentration ratios of two sub-samples. 
One sub-sample is represented by those sectors that had at least one M&A transaction. 
The other sub-sample is represented by sectors without any transaction. For all 
concentration ratios, in the case of the former 68 sectors sub-sample, the arithmetic 
average is positive and statistically different from zero. For the sub-sample of sectors 
with no transaction, the arithmetic average is negative though not significantly different 
from zero. When the averages of the two sub-samples are compared, the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level for all concentration ratios. It seems thus that 
concentration may be explained by the occurrence of M&A transactions. In fact, the 
evidence suggests that cœteris paribus concentration would decrease if M&A 
transactions were absent. However, the presence of other variables affecting 
concentration as well, as can be exemplified by correlation indexes in table 3, 
recommends the introduction of controls.  
 
3.2 M&A and Changes in Industrial Concentration 
 
Table 5 shows three equations that present results of the test of the equation showed in 
subsection 2.6. Equation (1) has dcr4 as dependent variable, dcr8 is the dependent 
variable in equation (2), and dcr12 is the dependent variable in equation (3). Though R-
square levels are not so high, F statistics is adequate.  
 
The change in the productivity (DPROD) is the variable with the highest explanatory 
power in all three equations. The higher the rate of growth of productivity is, the higher 
the change in concentration ratios will be. It should also be stressed that as concentration 
ratios rise along the concentration curve, the coefficient for DPROD lowers and so does t-
statistics. This may be indicating that companies with greater size are more likely to 
present increases in productivity and that this feature explains the gains of market share 
of leading companies. Furthermore, the evolution of the coefficient in the three equations 
suggests that the four leading companies squeeze the market shares of their immediate 
competitors, situated in positions from fifth to twelfth. 
 
One can infer from this evidence that at least in the productive context there is a positive 
correlation between increase in concentration and efficiency. This result may have 
implications for antitrust policies. However, some doubts still hold with respect to 
allocative efficiency.  
 
In order to address allocative efficiency, one should also evaluate changes in quantities 
and prices. It should be noted that the rate of growth of sales is positively correlated to 
changes in concentration (see table 3). This may be a consequence of changes in prices or 
quantities. On the other hand, in equation (1) through (3) the rgr changes sign though it is 
not significant. This is the result of the introduction of dprod variable. As it is shown in 
table 3, dprod and rgr are positively and significantly correlated.6  
 
The second most significant variable in equation (1) is the concentration level. The 
negative correlation between concentration and changes in concentration is a well-known 
stylized fact (Liebeskind, Opler and Hatfield 1996). However, in table 5, as the 
concentration ratio moves along the concentration curve, the module of the coefficient for 
the concentration ratio in 1996 radically decreases and the variable loses significance. 
Therefore, the initial concentration ratio would be explaining changes in market share of 
companies situated in the upper rankings, but does not explain changes in the market 
share of companies located in the ninth through twelfth position in the sales rankings.  
 
The dramatic decrease in the coefficient along the concentration curve may suggest that 
in less concentrated markets the four leading companies are increasing their market 
shares at the expense of companies situated in intermediary rankings. It should be made 
clear however that these changes may be a consequence of changes in the rankings and 
that such features are not object of this analysis. 
 
The dummy for the occurrence of M&A transactions has the exact opposite behavior to 
the initial concentration ratio. The dummy is positive in all three equations but it is 
statistically significant only in equations (2) and (3). The coefficient increases along the 
concentration curve. This suggests that M&A transactions are a more important 
                                                             
6 Therefore, contrary to Pryor (1994) and Liebeskind, Opler and Hatfield (1996), the rate of growth does not show  
significant correlation to changes in concentration.  
 
explanatory variable for changes in the market share of companies positioned between 
the ninth and twelfth position than in explaining changes in CR4. Once more, the analysis 
does not address turnover in companies’ rankings.  
 
One should observe that there is a clear correlation between concentration ratios in 1996 
and M&A. Table 3, shows that this correlation is significant at the 1% level for CR4 and 
at the 5% level for CR8 and CR12. In fact, if CRi is excluded from equations (1) through 
(3), M&A becomes significant at the 5% level in all equations. One possible explanation 
for the lack of significance of M&A in equation (1) would then be that the expansion of 
top four firms are mainly conditioned by the level of concentration in markets. If levels of 
concentrations are sufficiently low, they expand their market shares through many ways. 
This could include M&A transactions but it would comprise expansion using internal 
resources as well. On the other hand, the expansion of market share of firms situated 
between the fifth and twelfth positions in sales rankings would be more likely whenever 
there was the possibility of acquisition of smaller firms.  
 
The latter argument allows an important parallel with existing literature on other 
countries’ experience. It suggests that it is not obvious that M&A transactions will have a 
concentrating effect on markets, as it is argued by Hannah and Kay (1977, 1981) and Hay 
and Morris (1991). On the contrary, it indicates that depending on firms involved in the 
transaction, market structures may be less affected by M&A transactions. The argument 
is close to Liebeskind, Opler and Hatfield (1996) that suggest that the M&A wave of the 
80’s in the US involved the acquisition of divisions or plants – spun-off by bigger firms – 
by smaller companies. In the Brazilian case, in the 90’s, the M&A wave seems to be 
associated with the acquisition of smaller companies by firms of intermediary size.  
 
Some questions still remain. First, turnover of firms in the sales ranking is not covered by 
the analysis. It should be interesting to verify if firms that are more M&A intensive 
strategies have increased their market shares vis-à-vis firms that have not acquired. 
Second, the analysis does not allow an understanding about size of acquired firms. This 
weakens some of the conclusions. 
  
IV. Conclusion  
 
This paper suggests four main conclusions with respect to the process of productive 
concentration of the manufacturing and mining industries in Brazil:  
(i) The analyzed period has witnessed a small increase in average market 
concentration. All concentration indicators used in the paper confirm this 
tendency. This helps to clarify the rather blurred tendency presented in Rocha 
and Kupfer (2002); 
(ii) However, as suggested in Rocha and Kupfer (2002), though average 
concentration increases, there is great dispersion of the results. Some sectors 
have negative changes in concentration, others have quite huge changes 
towards the increase of concentration.   
(iii) The effect of M&A on concentration is far from striking. M&A seems to 
affect market shares of firms of intermediary size. The market shares of top 
four firms do not appear to be influenced by M&A transactions. This could be 
a consequence of some characteristics of the M&A wave presented in Rocha 
and Kupfer (2002), such as the strong participation of multinational 
enterprises that could be using acquisitions to enter the Brazilian market; and  
(iv) Increases in concentration do not seem to be associated with loss of economic 
efficiency. Though the behavior of prices and quantities is not addressed in 
this paper, the paper shows some evidence that increases in concentration are 
positively correlated with productivity gains.  
 
The results presented may also render some policy suggestions. More specifically, the 
paper indicates that there should not be special concern with efficiency losses caused by 
increases in concentration. However, the results do not allow general conclusions and due 
to the aggregated and unspecific character of the analysis, deeper analyses for specific 
cases are recommended. 
 
Finally, the paper suggests some recommendations for future research: 
(i) A detailed analysis of the effect of different modes of industrial restructuring 
on concentration in line with Liebeskind, Opler and Hatfield (1996) should be 
undertaken;  
(ii) A more detailed analysis of the import structure of industries should be made 
in order to correct for possible biases due to the exclusion of foreign market 
from the concentration analysis. In this sense a study of the origin of imports 
and its association with subsidiaries of multinationals that are market leaders 
in Brazil would help to understand the direction of changes if imports were 
included into the analysis;  
(iii) An analysis of impacts of concentration changes on profit margins would help 
to deepen knowledge about the effect of changes in concentration on 
efficiency; and 
(iv) Some analysis about companies involved in transactions would help to 
understand the role played by M&A in firms’ market shares. 
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Table 1 – Number of Transaction by Period and Percentage  
   of Shares Acquired, Brazil, 1990-1999. 
Period Percentage of Shares 
1990-1996 1997-1999 
Total 
0-25 25 21 46 
25-50 47 32 79 
50-75 39 49 88 
More than 75 156 170 326 
Not Informed 23 20 43 
Total 290 292 582 
Source: Thomson Financial. 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
CR41996 104 0,079 1,000 0,418 0,238 
CR81996 104 0,122 1,000 0,530 0,250 
CR121996 104 0,155 1,000 0,592 0,247 
CR42000 104 0,084 1,000 0,427 0,242 
CR82000 104 0,121 1,000 0,544 0,258 
CR122000 104 0,148 1,000 0,602 0,253 
DCR4 104 -0,400 0,376 0,010 0,096 
DCR8 104 -0,318 0,287 0,014 0,086 
DCR12 104 -0,270 0,233 0,011 0,079 
DPROD 104 -0,142 3,965 0,670 0,622 
DIFPROD 104 0,000 0,677 0,235 0,143 
INTTEC 103 0,002 0,038 0,015 0,010 
RGR 104 -0,472 8,344 0,719 0,980 
RENTER 104 -0,552 1,691 0,131 0,355 
Source: Own elaboration from Thomson Financial, IBGE – 
PIA, 1996-2000, IBGE – PINTEC, 2000. 
 
Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
 
 CR41996 CR81996 CR121996 DCR4 DCR8 DCR12 DPROD DIFPROD INTTEC RENTER RGR 
CR81996 0.974***           
CR121996 0.948*** 0.993***          
DCR4 -0.164* -0.118 -0.091         
DCR8 -0.102 -0.080 -0.058 0.918***        
DCR12 -0.105 -0.094 -0.082 0.857*** 0.976***       
DPROD 0.401*** 0.413*** 0.422 0.384*** 0.376*** 0.325***      
DIFPROD 0.283*** 0.319*** 0.346 0.034 -0.018 -0.072 0.370***     
INTTEC 0.333*** 0.358*** 0.379 -0.111 -0.100 -0.133 0.224** 0.640***    
RENTER 0.038 0.019 0.000 -0.123 -0.134 -0.152 -0.092 -0.214** -0.185*   
RGR 0.235** 0.218** 0.212 0.209** 0.200** 0.171* 0.738*** 0.296*** 0.255*** 0.185*  
MA -0.285*** -0.246** -0.216** 0.208** 0.235** 0.246** 0.018 0.041 0.012 -0.126 -0.098 
Source: Own elaboration from Thomson Financial, IBGE – PIA, 1996-2000, IBGE – PINTEC, 2000.  
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
 Table 4 –  Concentration Level and Changes of Concentration in the Brazilian  
  Manufacturing and Mining Industries, 1996-2000 
 
 
Number of 
Sectors 
CR4 CR8 CR12 
Arithmetic Average of Concentration Ratio in 1996  104 0,418 0,530 0,592 
Weighted Average of Concentration Ratio in 1996 104 0,415 0,521 0,583 
Weighted Average by 1996 Sales of Changes in 
Concentration Ratios, 1996-2000 
104 0,012277
 
0,019371
 
0,015658
 
Weighted Average by 2000 Sales of the Changes in 
Concentration Ratios, 1996-2000 
104 0,015757
 
0,023461
 
0,018871
 
Arithmetic Average of Changes in Concentration Ratios, 
1996-2000 
104 0,009558 0,013552 0,010694 
Standard Error  0,009145 0,008475 0,007778 
t-Statistics of Hypothesis Ho=0  1,015 1,599 1,375 
Arithmetic Average of Changes in Concentration in Sectors 
with M&A Transactions 
68 0,023992 0,028269 0,024797 
Standard Error  0,009776 0,009355 0,008888 
t-Statistics of Hypothesis Ho=0  2,457** 3,022*** 2,79** 
Arithmetic Average of Changes in Concentration in Sectors 
without M&A Transactions 
36 -0,017708 -0,014256 -0,015947 
Standard Error  0,019397 0,016139 0,014061 
t-Statistics of Hypothesis Ho=0  -0,913 -0,883 -1,134 
t-statistics for Mean Difference Test between Sectors with 
and without Transactions 
 2,144** 2,443** 2,558** 
Source: Own elaboration from Thomson Financial, IBGE – PIA, 1996-2000. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Tabela 5 – Least Square Regression Estimates 
Dependent Variable 
dcr4 dcr8 dcr12 
Equation (1) (2) (3) 
(Constant) 0,009 0,008 0,015 
 (0,323) (0,293) (0,604) 
F&A 0,016 0,028* 0,031* 
 (0,855) (1,620) (1,949) 
TXCRESC -0,023 -0,015 -0,005 
 (-0,963) (-0,700) (-0,224) 
TXNEMPR -0,011 -0,020 -0,030 
 (-0,431) (-0,798) (-1,328) 
INTTEC -1,012 -0,596 -0,752 
 (-0,882) (-0,561) (-0,760) 
DIFPROD -0,015 -0,077 -0,095 
 (-0,182) (-1,040) (-1,391) 
DPROD 0,099*** 0,081*** 0,061*** 
 (4,154) (3,647) (2,921) 
CRi1996 -0,132*** -0,069* -0,047 
 (-3,005) (-1,767) (-1,269) 
    
Adjusted R2  0,251 0,217 0,198 
F 5,878*** 5,027*** 4,588*** 
n 104 104 104 
t-statistics in parenthesis.  
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
 
